Assignments
Please pick ONE case from EACH chapter and submit a total of THREE cases on one Word document.
CHAPTER 13
Case 1
Beginning in 1996, Tanisha Matthews, an Apostolic Christian, worked as an overnight stocker at Wal-Mart's store in Joliet, Illinois. In September 2005, during a break in the overnight shift, Matthews took part in a conversation about God and homosexuality. The next day an employee informed a manager that Matthews had made inappropriate comments about gays to a gay employee named Amy. Over the next three months, Wal-Mart investigated the incident by interviewing and obtaining statements from employees who were present during the conversation. In her statement, Amy reported that Matthews was “screaming over her” that God does not accept gays, they should not “be on earth,” and they will “go to hell” because they are not “right in the head.” Five other employees confirmed that Matthews had said that gays are sinners and are going to hell.
Wal-Mart fired Matthews after concluding that she had engaged in serious harassment in violation of Wal-Mart's Discrimination and Harassment Prevention Policy. This policy, which Matthews was aware of at the time of the incident, prohibits employees from engaging in conduct that could reasonably be interpreted as harassment based on an individual's status, including sexual orientation, and provides that employees who violate the policy will receive “coaching and/or other discipline, up to and including termination.” Wal-Mart has a “zero tolerance” policy for harassment “regardless of whether such conduct rises to the level of unlawful discrimination or harassment” and treats serious harassment as gross misconduct and grounds for immediate termination.
Matthews filed suit, alleging that terminating her for stating that gays will go to hell—a belief that she maintains is an aspect of her Apostolic Christian faith—constitutes unlawful discrimination under Title VII. Is she correct? [Matthews v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 417 F. App'x 552 (7th Cir. 2011).]
Case 2
Benjamin Endres was an officer in the Indiana State Police. Soon after Indiana began licensing casinos, Endres was assigned by lottery to a full-time position as a Gaming Commission agent at the Blue Chip Casino in Michigan City, Indiana. Gaming Commission agents certify gambling revenue, investigate complaints from the public about the gaming system, and conduct licensing investigations for the casinos and their employees. Endres, a Baptist, believed that he must neither gamble nor help others do so, because games of chance are sinful.
Endres told the State Police that he was willing to enforce general vice laws at casinos, but that providing the specialized services required of Gaming Commission agents would violate his religious beliefs because it would facilitate gambling. When the State Police refused his request for a different assignment, Endres refused to report for duty and was fired for insubordination.
Endres sues under Title VII, contending that the State of Indiana discriminated against him on account of his religion by failing to reasonably accommodate his religious beliefs. The State of Indiana moves to dismiss the claim. How should the court rule? [Endres v. Indiana State Police, 349 F.3d 922 (7th Cir. 2003).]
CHAPTER 14
CASE 1
An American Wrecking Corporation (AWC) employee was killed when bricks fell on him as he prepared a section of building for demolition. AWC was cited for willfully violating the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH Act) governing the removal of loose material during the demolition process. Willful violations of the Act can serve as the basis of criminal complaints. AWC filed a review petition. At hearing, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration Review Committee's experts testified that the bricks were unstable and should have been taken down, while company employees stated that they believed that the bricks had been supported by iron in the structure. The administrative law judge ruled that the company had willfully violated the statute by not removing the bricks because the hazardous condition should have been obvious to the demolition supervisor. On appeal, should this ruling be upheld? If so, what would be the appropriate sentence? [American Wrecking Corp. v. Secretary of Labor, 351 F.3d 1254 (D.C. Cir. 2003).]
CASE 2
Bert's Sporting Goods, Inc., with stores located throughout the state of Lys, sells a wide variety of sporting goods, including guns. Section 123.45 of the Lys Penal Code requires sellers of guns to verify that the purchaser has not committed a felony within the last five years. If the purchaser has committed a felony within the last five years, the seller is not allowed to make the sale. Selling a gun to a recent felon is considered a misdemeanor and is punishable by up to one year in jail and/or a maximum $10,000 fine.
Jim Dandy, who was convicted of a felony under Lys's penal code four years ago, went to purchase a gun at one of the Bert's Sporting Goods stores. Joe Mountain, a salesman at Bert's, sold Dandy the gun without asking for identification or checking to see whether Dandy was a convicted felon.
As a matter of fact, Mountain never checked whether any of the customers to whom he sold guns were felons. Mountain did not know of the Lys law requiring him to check on the customer's prior criminal history. However, Jay Lake, Mountain's supervisor, knew of the law and also knew that Mountain never checked whether a customer was a felon. Bert, the sole shareholder and director of Bert's Sporting Goods, Inc., knew about the law but did not know that Mountain did not check on his customers' prior criminal history.
Dandy used the gun in a robbery and shot two police officers during his getaway. He was never captured. Can Mountain be punished under section 123.45 of the Lys Penal Code? What about Lake? Bert? Bert's Sporting Goods, Inc.? What penalties should be assessed? [See, e.g., Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994).]
CHAPTER 15
CASE 1
Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chemical Company (NEPACCO) had a manufacturing plant in Verona, Missouri, that produced various hazardous and toxic byproducts. The company pumped the byproducts into a holding tank, which a waste hauler periodically emptied. Michaels founded the company, was a major shareholder, and served as its president. In 1971, a waste hauler named Mills approached Ray, a chemical-plant manager employed by NEPACCO, and proposed disposing of some of the firm's wastes at a nearby farm. Ray visited the farm and, with the approval of Lee, the vice president and a shareholder of NEPACCO, arranged for disposal of wastes at the farm.
Approximately eighty-five 55-gallon drums were dumped into a large trench on the farm. In 1976, NEPACCO was liquidated, and the assets remaining after payment to creditors were distributed to its shareholders. Three years later the EPA investigated the area and discovered dozens of badly deteriorated drums containing hazardous waste buried at the farm. The EPA took remedial action and then sought to recover its costs under RCRA and other statutes. From whom and on what basis can the government recover its costs? [United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co., 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986).]
CASE 2
In 1960, Brown & Bryant, Inc. (B&B) began operating an agricultural chemical distributions business, purchasing pesticides and other chemical products from suppliers, including Shell Oil Company. When a certain chemical bought from Shell would arrive at B&B's warehouse in tanker trucks, it was transferred from the trucks to a bulk storage tank located on B&B's primary parcel. From there, the chemical was transferred to other trucks, tanks, and rigs. During each of these transfers, leaks and spills could—and often did—occur. Aware that spills of the chemical were occurring frequently among its distributors, in the late 1970s Shell took several steps to encourage the safe handling of its products. Despite these improvements, B&B remained a “sloppy operator.” In 1983, a state agency began investigating B&B's violation of hazardous waste laws, and the EPA soon followed suit. To recoup cleanup costs, the EPA filed suit against several parties, including Shell. The EPA argued that Shell was an “arranger” subject to liability under CERCLA because it had arranged for the disposal of hazardous substances through its sale and delivery, even though it did not “intend” to dispose of a hazardous substance. Does the EPA have a valid argument? Is mere knowledge that spills and leaks occurred sufficient grounds for concluding that Shell “arranged for” the disposal of the chemical under CERCLA? [Burlington Northern & Sante Fe Railway Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870 (2009).]