Disruptive technologieshave been a mainstay of debatesin strategic management since 1995. They have been used extensively byconsultantsas well as academics. The idea of disruptive innovation was...

Disruptive technologieshave been a mainstay of debatesin strategic management since 1995. They have been used extensively byconsultantsas well as academics. The idea of disruptive innovation was proposed by Clayton Christensen of Harvard Business School, and while it was widely adopted, it has also been extensivelycritiqued.Clayton Christensen wrote an article in HBR (attached) in December 2015, where he defended (and put limits on) his concept [He has two co-authors in this article, but the concept is associated with him]. Please read the article fully before you commence this assignment. [You can skim the above links, but not the attached article].Imagine yourself a consultant. Please write a memo to Uber where you suggest how they can use the idea of a disruptive technology to improve its operations.Your essay should contain the following:

1. Briefly summarize the keypoints in Christensen's article in that memo.


2. Provide your own opinion, i.e. whether you agree or disagree with Christensen by answering the question: "IsUbera disruptive innovation?"​ Provide numeric support to your arguments.


3. Present one clear identification of a strategic problem faced by Uber in today’s world.


4. Present one suggestion of how Uber can tackle the strategic problem. Support your suggestion with numeric information.

The essay should be about 500 words long, and have an original title.


THE BIG IDEA WHAT IS 44  Harvard Business Review December 2015 Twenty years after the introduction of the theory, we revisit what it does—and doesn’t—explain. BY CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, MICHAEL RAYNOR, AND RORY MCDONALD Clayton M. Christensen is the Kim B. Clark Professor of Business Administration at Harvard Business School. Michael Raynor is a director at Deloitte Consulting LLP. Rory McDonald is an assistant professor at Harvard Business School. HBR.ORG December 2015 Harvard Business Review 45 The problem with conflating a disruptive in- novation with any breakthrough that changes an industry’s competitive patterns is that different types of innovation require different strategic ap- proaches. To put it another way, the lessons we’ve learned about succeeding as a disruptive innovator (or defending against a disruptive challenger) will not apply to every company in a shifting market. If we get sloppy with our labels or fail to integrate insights from subsequent research and experience into the original theory, then managers may end up using the wrong tools for their context, reduc- ing their chances of success. Over time, the theory’s usefulness will be undermined. This article is part of an effort to capture the state of the art. We begin by exploring the basic tenets of disruptive innovation and examining whether they apply to Uber. Then we point out some common pitfalls in the theory’s application, how these arise, and why correctly using the theory matters. We go on to trace major turning points in the evolution of our thinking and make the case that what we have learned allows us to more accurately predict which businesses will grow. First, a quick recap of the idea: “Disruption” de- scribes a process whereby a smaller company with fewer resources is able to successfully challenge established incumbent businesses. Specifically, as incumbents focus on improving their products and services for their most demanding (and usually most profitable) customers, they exceed the needs of some segments and ignore the needs of others. Entrants that prove disruptive begin by success- fully targeting those overlooked segments, gaining a foothold by delivering more-suitable functionality— frequently at a lower price. Incumbents, chasing higher profitability in more-demanding segments, tend not to respond vigorously. Entrants then move upmarket, delivering the performance that incum- bents’ mainstream customers require, while pre- serving the advantages that drove their early success. When mainstream customers start adopting the en- trants’ offerings in volume, disruption has occurred. (See the exhibit “The Disruptive Innovation Model.”) Is Uber a Disruptive Innovation? Let’s consider Uber, the much-feted transportation company whose mobile application connects con- sumers who need rides with drivers who are willing to provide them. Founded in 2009, the company has Unfortunately, disruption theory is in danger of becoming a victim of its own success. Despite broad dissemination, the theory’s core concepts have been widely misunderstood and its basic tenets fre- quently misapplied. Furthermore, essential refine- ments in the theory over the past 20 years appear to have been overshadowed by the popularity of the initial formulation. As a result, the theory is some- times criticized for shortcomings that have already been addressed. There’s another troubling concern: In our expe- rience, too many people who speak of “disruption” have not read a serious book or article on the subject. Too frequently, they use the term loosely to invoke the concept of innovation in support of whatever it is they wish to do. Many researchers, writers, and con- sultants use “disruptive innovation” to describe any situation in which an industry is shaken up and pre- viously successful incumbents stumble. But that’s much too broad a usage. he theory of disruptive innovation, introduced in these pages in 1995, has proved to be a powerful way of thinking about innovation-driven growth. Many leaders of small, entrepreneurial companies praise it as their guiding star; so do many executives at large, well-established organizations, including Intel, Southern New Hampshire University, and Salesforce.com. THE BIG IDEA WHAT IS DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION? 46  Harvard Business Review December 201546  Harvard Business Review December 2015 enjoyed fantastic growth (it operates in hundreds of cities in 60 countries and is still expanding). It has reported tremendous financial success (the most recent funding round implies an enterprise value in the vicinity of $50 billion). And it has spawned a slew of imitators (other start-ups are trying to emulate its “market-making” business model). Uber is clearly transforming the taxi business in the United States. But is it disrupting the taxi business? According to the theory, the answer is no. Uber’s financial and strategic achievements do not qualify the company as genuinely disruptive—although the company is almost always described that way. Here are two reasons why the label doesn’t fit. Disruptive innovations originate in low-end or new-market footholds. Disruptive innovations are made possible because they get started in two types of markets that incumbents overlook. Low- end footholds exist because incumbents typically try to provide their most profitable and demanding customers with ever-improving products and ser- vices, and they pay less attention to less-demanding customers. In fact, incumbents’ offerings often over- shoot the performance requirements of the latter. This opens the door to a disrupter focused (at first) on providing those low-end customers with a “good enough” product. In the case of new-market footholds, disrupt- ers create a market where none existed. Put simply, they find a way to turn nonconsumers into consum- ers. For example, in the early days of photocopying technology, Xerox targeted large corporations and charged high prices in order to provide the perfor- mance that those customers required. School librar- ians, bowling-league operators, and other small customers, priced out of the market, made do with carbon paper or mimeograph machines. Then in the late 1970s, new challengers introduced personal Idea in Brief THE ISSUE The ideas summed up in the phrase “disruptive innovation” have become a powerful part of business thinking—but they’re in danger of losing their usefulness because they’ve been misunderstood and misapplied. THE RESPONSE The leading authorities on disruptive innovation revisit the central tenets of disruption theory, its development over the past 20 years, and its limitations. THE BOTTOM LINE Does it matter whether Uber, say, is a disruptive innovation or something else entirely? It does: We can’t manage innovation effectively if we don’t grasp its true nature. copiers, offering an affordable solution to individu- als and small organizations—and a new market was created. From this relatively modest beginning, per- sonal photocopier makers gradually built a major position in the mainstream photocopier market that Xerox valued. A disruptive innovation, by definition, starts from one of those two footholds. But Uber did not originate in either one. It is difficult to claim that the company found a low-end opportunity: That would have meant taxi service providers had overshot the needs of a material number of customers by mak- ing cabs too plentiful, too easy to use, and too clean. Neither did Uber primarily target nonconsumers— people who found the existing alternatives so expen- sive or inconvenient that they took public transit or drove themselves instead: Uber was launched in San Francisco (a well-served taxi market), and Uber’s customers were generally people already in the habit of hiring rides. Uber has quite arguably been increasing total demand—that’s what happens when you develop a better, less-expensive solution to a widespread customer need. But disrupters start by appealing to low-end or unserved consumers and then migrate to the mainstream market. Uber has gone in exactly the opposite direction: building a position in the main- stream market first and subsequently appealing to historically overlooked segments. Disruptive innovations don’t catch on with mainstream customers until quality catches up to their standards. Disruption theory differ- entiates disruptive innovations from what are called “sustaining innovations.” The latter make good prod- ucts better in the eyes of an incumbent’s existing customers: the fifth blade in a razor, the clearer TV picture, better mobile phone reception. These im- provements can be incremental advances or major HBR.ORG December 2015 Harvard Business Review 47 breakthroughs, but they all enable firms to sell more products to their most profitable customers. Disruptive innovations, on the other hand, are initially considered inferior by most of an incum­ bent’s customers. Typically, customers are not will­ ing to switch to the new offering merely because it is less expensive. Instead, they wait until its quality rises enough to satisfy them. Once that’s happened, they adopt the new product and happily accept its lower price. (This is how disruption drives prices down in a market.) Most of the elements of Uber’s strategy seem to be sustaining innovations. Uber’s service has rarely been described as inferior to existing taxis; in fact, many would say it is better. Booking a ride requires just a few taps on a smartphone; payment is cash­ less and convenient; and passengers can rate their rides afterward, which helps ensure high standards. Furthermore, Uber delivers service reliably and punctually, and its pricing is usually competitive with (or lower than) that of established taxi services. And as is typical when incumbents face threats from sustaining innovations, many of the taxi compa­ nies are motivated to respond. They are deploying competitive technologies, such as hailing apps, and contesting the legality of some of Uber’s services. Why Getting It Right Matters Readers may still be wondering, Why does it matter what words we use to describe Uber? The company has certainly thrown the taxi industry into disarray: Isn’t that “disruptive” enough? No. Applying the theory correctly is essential to realizing its benefits. For example, small competitors that nibble away at the periphery of your business very likely should be ignored—unless they are on a disruptive trajectory, in which case they are a potentially mortal threat. And both of these challenges are fundamentally different from efforts by competitors to woo your bread­and­butter customers. As the example of Uber shows, identifying true disruptive innovation is tricky. Yet even executives with a good understanding of disruption theory tend to forget some