Short Paper 1, assignment attached.
Short paper 1 guideline-new.pdf Student Guide for Short paper 1 This assignment can be group work or individual work, depending on your preference. A maximum of 3 group members is allowed. You will be assigned one of the journal articles by the professor. The assigned journal article number can be found in the gradebook on D2L (Journal article number). The purpose of this assignment is for you to write a research proposal based on a published research paper before developing a research proposal of your own topic. You will first need to read the article carefully and thoroughly. Then assuming that you are about to conduct the research described in the paper, write a research proposal. In the research proposal, you will need to provide the background/introduction, purpose of the study, research hypotheses, data and methodology, all of which should come from the journal paper. A general outline of the research proposal is given below. Note that you need to summarize/rephrase the corresponding contents in the paper using your own words. Directly copying from the paper is plagiarism and not acceptable. Refer to the Academic Honesty Policy for consequences of plagiarism. Formatting The proposal should be double-spaced using Times New Roman 12 font and should not exceed 1000 words, including references and appendix, if any. You are required to follow APA style when writing the short paper. Here is a tutorial on APA style: http://gseacademic.harvard.edu/~instruct/articulate/apa_mod/APA_Intro/player.html The file name h ld be The file name h ld be La name 1_La name 2_La name 3_project name . Research proposal outline Cover Page: Include a title of the research proposal, course number, course name, and he a h name Background/current situation: What led you/the authors to address this problem? Why is the research important? Purpose of the Research: What is the purpose of the proposed research? What contribution the proposed research will provide? Research hypotheses: What are the research hypotheses that will be tested in the proposed research. Research hypotheses are usually clearly stated in published journal papers. You can directly copy and paste the hypotheses. This is the only exception to the plagiarism policy. Research design and sample design: you should discuss the data that will be used in the research. If it is primary data (collected through surveys), describe what type of surveys will be used, how sample will be selected, what is the expected sample size, etc. If it is secondary data, you should describe the source of the data. You will also need to briefly describe that the methodology that will be used to analyze the data collected. Note that you do not need to have fully understanding of the methodology. One or two sentences about the methodology should be sufficient. Breaking the mold_ An examination of board discretion in female CEO appointments T Journal of Business Research 84 (2018) 11–23 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Journal of Business Research journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jbusres Breaking the mold: An examination of board discretion in female CEO appointments Jennifer M. Knippena, Jennifer Palarb, Richard J. Gentryc,⁎ a Department of Management, Eckerd College, United States b Department of Management, Augustana College, United States c The University of Mississippi, P.O. Box 1848, 339 Holman, University, MS 38677-1848, United States A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T Keywords: Boards of directors Discretion Female CEOs We propose and test a theory of board discretion in the context of the board's selection of a female CEO. We propose that boards also have discretion, an area that has typically focused exclusively on managers, and ex- amine the conditions under which boards, facing high levels of uncertainty, have the latitude to make non- traditional choices, particularly when a negative equity market reaction to such a selection is likely. In the context of the nontraditional choice of a female CEO successor, we observe that the strong financial health of the firm and boardroom and situation-specific experience grant the board the discretion to select a female CEO. We test our model using all Standard & Poors (S&P) 1500 firms that experienced a CEO succession between 2000 and 2013. Implications for practice and research are discussed. 1. Introduction Although still largely underrepresented, the number of female CEOs has increased among the corporate elite in recent years. There are currently more women serving as CEO of large U.S. firms than at any other time, with 13 of the 26 female CEOs in 2016 being appointed within the last several years (Covert, 2013). In 2015, there were more men named John running S&P 1500 companies than women (Wolfers, 2015). The lack of women at the top of organizations relative to the multitude of women at lower levels in the organizations suggests that businesses are not fully exploiting their talent pool (Hernes, 1987). Research provides evidence of potential benefits of diversity in the upper echelons, such as new perspectives and problem-solving (Helgesen, 1990), increased firm innovation (Torchia, Calabrò, & Huse, 2011), and board effectiveness (Nielsen & Huse, 2010). Research sug- gests that a woman's presence at the top of an organization evokes both positive and negative responses from key stakeholders. On the one hand, it signals equal opportunity to women at the organization's lower levels (Bilimoria, 2007). However, on the otherhand, apprehension surrounds this nontraditional successor choice. This apprehension manifests as a negative equity market reaction to women CEO an- nouncements (Lee & James, 2007). Recent findings indicate that male corporate directors categorize women as out-group members and may possess a negative social bias toward their board appointment and their election to major board committees (Westphal & Stern, 2007; Zhu, Shen, & Hillman, 2014). Given this expected negative market reaction and the resistance to women among the corporate elite, what are the conditions under which boards have the discretion to promote a female candidate or make other strategic changes that may be perceived as unconventional? The literature establishes that one of the board's most important re- sponsibilities is CEO selection (Vancil, 1987). Boards focus largely on maintaining firm performance (e.g., Borokhovich, Parrino, & Trapani, 1996; Brickley, Linck, & Coles, 1999; Tian, Haleblian, & Rajagopalan, 2011), and managing the CEO transition is one way in which the board is directly tied to firm performance. CEO succession, a key organizational event (Kesner & Sebora, 1994), requires careful stakeholder management (Graffin, Carpenter, & Boivie, 2011). With the new CEO's ability to perform and the market's response to the CEO announcement comes uncertainty (Kesner & Sebora, 1994; Khurana, 2002; Lorsch & Khurana, 1999). Boards are held responsible for the success of the CEOs they ap- point; a positive market reaction is not guaranteed; and a negative re- action may adversely affect the new CEO's early tenure (Khurana, 2002). It is reasonable that a board of directors may be hesitant to appoint a nontraditional candidate who, more than likely, will be received nega- tively by the market (Lee & James, 2007). Research suggests that di- rectors associated with negative firm events are more likely to lose their board appointments, further strengthening their motivation to manage the succession process conservatively (e.g., Arthaud-Day, Certo, Dalton, & Dalton, 2006; Gilson, 1989; Srinivasan, 2005). ⁎ Corresponding author. E-mail addresses:
[email protected] (J.M. Knippen),
[email protected] (J. Palar),
[email protected] (R.J. Gentry). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2017.10.057 Received 5 November 2016; Received in revised form 30 October 2017; Accepted 31 October 2017 Available online 11 November 2017 0148-2963/ © 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01482963 https://www.elsevier.com/locate/jbusres https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2017.10.057 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2017.10.057 mailto:
[email protected] mailto:
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[email protected] https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2017.10.057 http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1016/j.jbusres.2017.10.057&domain=pdf J.M. Knippen et al. Journal of Business Research 84 (2018) 11–23 Despite the board's important role in shaping firm strategy (Dalziel, Gentry, & Bowerman, 2011; Goodstein & Boeker, 1991; Tuggle, Schnatterly, & Johnson, 2010), the literature has primarily focused on the board's role in changing strategy or dismissing an inadequate CEO as a mechanism to improve performance (Tian et al., 2011; Zajac, 1990) rather than on the conditions under which a board has more or less discretion to pursue a particular strategic choice, an important ante- cedent to the firm performance discussion. Although many researchers have studied the board's interpersonal dynamics and bias (e.g., Zhu et al., 2014) and the board's external impression management (Graffin et al., 2011), few researchers have examined how uncertainty influ- ences strategic board decisions, namely, the appointment of a non- traditional CEO (i.e., a woman). Research tends to treat the board's inability to execute an appropriate strategy as a function of its own resource deficiency or agency conflict rather than as an outcome of the complex interplay between external stakeholder management and in- ternal board dynamics that accompany any major board decision. Al- though Rindova (1999) and Vancil (1987) both suggest boards make decisions differently than top management (e.g., via consensus- building), the constraints on the range of strategic options available to the board—in other words, the board's discretion—has not been thor- oughly investigated. The purpose of this study is to address these issues and, in doing so, make two important contributions to the literature. First, we extend Hambrick and Finkelstein's (1987) theoretical work on managerial discretion to boards of directors. We explore the conditions under which board discretion is enhanced by examining a strategically im- portant context where the board's complex interaction with the CEO is more isolated (Krause, Semadeni, & Cannella, 2014), that is, during new CEO selection. In so doing, we identify external and internal fac- tors that influence the board's ability to pursue a norm-violating strategy and