Introduction to Philosophy Explain Socrates’ objection to the notion that piety is defined as what all the gods love and impiety is defined as what all the gods hate Explain one of the Gettier cases...

Introduction to Philosophy
Explain Socrates’ objection to the notion that piety is defined as what all the gods love and impiety is defined as what all the gods hate
Answer: The Greek word "hosion" is rendered as "piety" or "the pious" in English. This term can alternatively be interpreted as religious accuracy or sanctity. Piety has two meanings: first, a limited sense of knowing and doing what is proper in religious rituals; and second, a broad sense of knowing and doing what is correct in religious rituals. Knowing what prayers to say on a certain occasion or how to execute a sacrifice, for example. Second, righteousness in a wide sense; being a decent person. Euthyphro starts with a more limited definition of piety in mind. However, Socrates, in keeping with his overall attitude, prefers to emphasize the wide connotation. He is more concerned with living morally than with following precise procedure. (Jesus' attitude toward Judaism is similar.) The crux of the debate is Socrates' argument against this definition. His critique is subtle, but it is effective. He asks, "Do the gods adore piety because it is pious, or do the gods love it because it is pious?" Consider the following comparable question to better understand the intent of the inquiry: Is a film humorous because people laugh at it, or is it hilarious because people laugh at it? We are stating something weird if we say it is humorous because people laugh at it. We are implying that the film is only hilarious because certain people have a particular perspective about it. But, in Socrates' opinion, this is the wrong way around. People laugh at a movie because it has a certain quality, namely, it is funny. This is where they get their chuckles. Similarly, things are not holy just because the gods think so. Rather, the gods adore pious deeds like assisting a stranger in need because such deeds possess an inherent quality, that of being pious (Thune & Wisdom, 2015).
Explain one of the Gettier cases against the idea that knowledge is justified true belief and two strategies that philosophers have used to address such Gettier cases.
Answer: Few current epistemologists believe the JTB analysis is adequate. Although most people believe that each component of the tripartite hypothesis is required for knowledge, they do not appear to be adequate when taken together. There appear to be instances where justified genuine belief falls short of knowledge. Here's an example of what I am talking about: Assume we are looking for water on a scorching day. We think we see water when we suddenly see it. In truth, we are seeing a mirage rather than water, but when we get to the location, we are fortunate and find water just behind a rock. Can we claim to have true water knowledge? The answer appears to be negative, since we were just fortunate. This example comes from Dharmottara, an Indian philosopher who lived around 770 CE. Assume Plato is next to you and you know he is running, but you wrongly think he is Socrates, and you are convinced Socrates is running. Allow it to be that Socrates is indeed running in Rome, but you are unaware of this. Edmund Gettier's 1963 work, "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?" made famous cases like these, in which justified true belief appears to be divorced from truth in some fundamental way. Gettier outlined two scenarios in which a justified false belief is used to infer a genuine belief. He remarked that such views, instinctively, cannot be knowledge; they are just fortunate that they are correct. Cases like this have been known as "Gettier cases" in honour of his contribution to the literature (Thune & Wisdom, 2015). Many epistemologists have attempted to repair the JTB analysis since they appear to disprove it: how can the analysis of knowledge be adjusted to include Gettier cases? The "Gettier issue" is a term used to describe this situation. One of the functions of the justification, as mentioned above, is to rule out fortunate guesses as examples of knowing. The Gettier dilemma teaches us that even accurate beliefs that are justified can be epistemically fortunate in ways that are inconsistent with knowledge. Epistemologists who believe the JTB method is essentially correct must pick between two approaches to solve the Gettier dilemma. To rule out Gettier instances as justified belief situations, the first step is to tighten the justification requirement. Roderick Chisholm attempted this; we will return to this technique in section 7 below. The alternative option is to add an appropriate fourth criterion to the JTB analysis, one that prevents justified genuine belief from being "gettiered." The JTB analysis is now a JTB+X account of knowledge, with the “X” being the required fourth condition.
Explain the consequence argument for incompatibilism
Answer: Van Inwagen, the most prominent contemporary incompatibilist, rejects any suggestion that the compatibilist and incompatibilist have a purely verbal disagreement, either because they use different definitions of "can" ('ability,' "power," "free will," etc.) or because they focus on different contexts of utterance. According to him, the dispute is about whether determinism has the result that no one is ever able to do otherwise (equivalently, that no one is ever in a position to do otherwise) given what ordinary people mean in the situations in which they use these...