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[email protected]. Page 1 of 6 Faculty of Engineering, Environment and Computing December 2020 3043EXQ Crisis Complexity and disaster Aetiology Open Book Time Constrained Assessment Please complete the information in table below. Course Year/Stage Calculator Make and Model Date Student Card ID Number Answer: 2 Questions. (1 Question from Part A and 1 Question from Part B) The total number of questions in this paper: 6 For this TCA you will be supplied with the following: A PowerPoint template to record and return audio and text based answers Instructions to Students 1. Upon submission of this assessment, you are declaring this is your own work and has not been copied in part or in whole from any other source except where duly acknowledged. 2. Students must not communicate with others whilst the assessment is in progress and do not use any unauthorised materials or items. 3. You will have 7 days to complete this assessment. 4. Use the designated answers PowerPoint template provided on Aula to record audio and written answers [noting a maximum of 5-minutes audio narration for each question]. 5. You may use bullet point text and/or visual images on the PowerPoint slide to add emphasis to your 5-minutes of audio commentary. Font should be no smaller than size 12 Arial, with no more than 200-words a single slide. The audio commentary should not exceed 1000-words per question. 6. Check your audio content is clear and audible, and slide notes are correct. 7. Before the end of the assessment time, read all your answers through carefully and upload to Moodle for resit/deferred attempts or Aula for normal or repeat attempts before the deadline. Do not leave uploading too late. 8. Do not include your name anywhere in this paper or in the filename. 3043EXQ/5 Page 2 of 6 continued… IMPORTANT: Under the direction of the Module Leader (who circulated instructions) you should have already practiced adding audio commentary to the PowerPoint template available on Aula “Assessment” section 3043EXQ/5 Page 3 of 6 continued… Part A: Answer ONE question in this section Q1. Draw and critically explain Turner’s (1997) Disaster Incubation Model as it relates to the Piper Alpha Disaster of 1988. Your answer will contain the following: a) A correct drawing of Turner’s Disaster Incubation Model with all elements correctly displayed [15 marks] b) Application of the Piper Alpha Disaster Case Study provided through the lens of Turner’s Disaster Incubation Model [15 marks] c) Critical explanation of terminology, argument alignment, and use of Turner’s theories (including Sloppy Management, Incubation, Failure of Foresight, Preconditions and Trade-offs) [10 marks] d) Good referencing applied with clear audio and event reconstruction [10 marks] [Total=50 marks] Q2. Draw and critically examine Reason’s (1990) Swiss Cheese Model as it relates to the RAF Nimrod crash over Kandahar in 2006. Your answer will contain the following: a) A correct drawing of Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model with all elements correctly displayed [15 marks] b) Application of the RAF Nimrod Case Study provided through the lens of Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model [15 marks] c) Critical examination of terminology, argument alignment, and use of Reason’s theories (including Resident Pathogens, Layered Defences, Trajectories of Failure, Latency and Active Errors) [10 marks] d) Good referencing applied with clear audio and event reconstruction [10 marks] [Total=50 marks] Q3. Critically explain the value of Flin’s (2008) Non-Technical Skills (NTS) as prescribed for Incident Management within disaster settings. Your answer will contain the following: a) Overview of Flin et all’s 7 Non-Technical Skills with higher marks for sub-elements correctly added [15 marks] b) Application of multiple Incident/ Crisis management theories and models (inclusive of definitions) [15 marks] c) Contextualisation and examples of NTS applied in a critical and rational way to Incident Management [10 marks] Good referencing applied with clear audio and event reconstruction [10 marks] d) [Total=50 marks] 3043EXQ/5 Page 4 of 6 continued… Part B: Answer ONE question in this section SCENARIO (PHILLIPS Petroleum Company, PASADENA, USA. 23RD OCTOBER 1989) Accident summary At approximately 1:00 p.m. on the 23rd October 1989 Phillips chemical complex at Pasadena, near Houston (USA) experienced a chemical release on the polyethylene plant. A flammable vapour cloud formed which subsequently ignited resulting in a massive vapour cloud explosion. Following this initial explosion there was a series of further explosions and fires. The consequences of the explosions resulted in 23 fatalities and between 130 - 300 people were injured. Extensive damage to the plant facilities occurred. The day before the incident scheduled maintenance work had begun to clear three of the six settling legs on a reactor. A specialist maintenance contractor was employed to carry out the work. A procedure was in place to isolate the leg to be worked on. During the clearing of No.2 settling leg part of the plug remained lodged in the pipework. A member of the team went to the control room to seek assistance. Shortly afterwards the release occurred. Approximately 2 minutes later the vapour cloud ignited. Failings in technical measures • Maintenance Procedures: isolation Both the company and industry safety required isolation by means of a double-block system or the use of blind flange. However, at a plant level a procedure had been adopted which did not comply with this. The accident investigation established that the single isolating ball valve was actually open at the time of the release. The air hoses to the valve had been cross-connected so that the air supply that should have closed the valve actually opened it. • Maintenance Procedures: recommissioning Site procedures laid down details that air hoses to valves were to be disconnected prior to maintenance work. This task was not carried out. • Maintenance Procedures: training/competence, management/supervision The site held a large inventory of flammable materials under high pressure, yet it had no fixed gas detection system. • Leak / Gas Detection: positioning of detectors Ventilation intakes of buildings close to or downwind of the process plant were not arranged so as to prevent the intake of gas in the event of a release. • Plant Layout: positioning of occupied buildings Permit to work Systems: working in hazardous areas An effective permit to work (PTW) for both company employees and contractors was not enforced by the company. Firefighting process: There was no dedicated fire water system . Fire water was drawn off from the process water system. This system was severely damaged in the explosions resulting in a loss of water pressure. The fire water pumps failed when the raging fires attacked their electrical supply cables. Of the three standby diesel pumps units, one was under maintenance and another ran out of fuel. 3043EXQ/5 Page 5 of 6 continued… • Active / Passive Fire Protection: testing and inspection Some concern was expressed as to the audible level of the emergency alarm. It was likely that individuals in certain parts of the plant were unable to hear the siren. • Warning Signs: human factors The intended control centre was damaged beyond use and telephone communications disrupted. • Emergency Response / Spill Control: site emergency plan The location of the control room, separation distances between plant and escape routes (particularly for administrative staff) were all criticised. • Plant Layout: position of occupied buildings Q4