I have attached THREE case studies. One reading about AIDS/CONDOMS, and one pdf with AID/CONDOM REAL questions to answer . I emphasize real questions to answer because there are FALSE questions at the bottom of the article. you must answer the questions from the pdf labeled "REAL QUESTIONS “ to answer. Then you have the second case study reading" TOBACCO " and its pdf attached with the real questions to answer. Then “Amazon “ reading and its separate pdf for real questions to answer. No posting questions. no cheggg, no course hero she is beyond strict and i graduate in 2 weeks. there are zero extensions this summer class as its one month long . This is 45% of my grade. Each question is one paragraph long, the department of this class is international business but the course is MKT 4593 "Special topics in digital mkt". Total of 3 case studies… Basically 3 readings and sets of questions for each reading one paragraph per question. total of 10 questions across all pdfs. Im also giving a 12 day notice.
In the spring of 2014, Amazon.com, Inc. (“Amazon”), saw its chief competitor in China, Alibaba Group, file documents with the SEC for an initial public offering that could be one of the largest in history. At the same time, its main competitor in Brazil, Merc- adoLibre, sustained an approximate 40% loss in stock price despite several years of profitability, and its two chief competitors in India, Flipkart and Snapdeal, formed separate mergers with other related firms. The intense battle for control of a country’s e-wallet was noth- ing new to Diego Piacentini, senior vice president of International Consumer Business, and Jeff Bezos, founder and CEO. Their deci- sion to launch Amazon.in in June 2013 marked Amazon’s eleventh country-specific portal after nineteen years of operation. China was Amazon’s first emerging market website, and India only its third. Compared to its experience in China and Brazil, Amazon followed a different business model and strategy in India. What led to the differing approaches and which, if any, of Amazon’s emerging mar- kets’ strategies and investments would succeed? The case starts by examining Amazon’s entry into India and then turns to Amazon’s experience in China and Brazil. AMAZON’S INTERNATIONAL EXPANSION Incorporated in 1994, Amazon had evolved from a small online vendor of books and other information-based products in 1997 into a global “customer-centric” company serving consumers, sellers, and developers with operations in 22 countries. Amazon’s inter- national expansion started in 1998 when it acquired Bookseller, Ltd. (bookseller.co.uk) in the United Kingdom and Telebook, Inc. (telebuch.de) in Germany. These two sites gave rise to what became Amazon.co.uk and Amazon.de, respectively. It was early in 2000, during this initial European expansion, that Amazon hired Piacentini, who had been Apple’s general manager for Europe. Since his hiring, Amazon launched nine other country-specific websites, in Italy, France, Spain, Japan, China, Mexico, Brazil, Canada, and Australia. In other countries such as Costa Rica and South Africa, Amazon located customer service, software develop- ment, fulfillment or back office operations. In 2013, Amazon’s Germany, UK, and Japan sites accounted for 85% of total international revenues of $30.0 billion. Overall, Amazon’s international markets (excluding its Canadian site) made up 40% of Amazon’s total revenues of $74.4 billion (see Appendix B for consolidated financial results). However, despite a growth of 14% in net sales between 2012 and 2013, Amazon’s international business had seen a period of declining rate of growth since 2011 (see Appendix C for a geographic break-out). Would this declining growth rate foreshadow what was to come for Amazon’s interna- tional markets, or be merely water under the bridge according to Bezos and Amazon’s “marathon” mind-set of emphasizing cus- tomer service and long-term gains in sacrifice of short-term profits? THE INDIAN E-COMMERCE MARKET On June 5, 2013, Amazon officially entered the Indian market with its launch of Amazon.in. Although the Indian government had lib- eralized its strict foreign direct investment (FDI) laws in Septem- ber 2012, the resulting regulations still forbid foreign multi-brand Amazon in Emerging MarketsCASE 3-8 retailers from having over 51% ownership.1 As a result, Amazon could not replicate its U.S. business of selling its own products in addition to serving as a selling platform for third-party vendors. In India, Amazon would only be able to function as a pure market- place that would connect domestic sellers to buyers in the market. For Amazon, these FDI considerations would be only the first hur- dle encountered in the nascent but fast-growing Indian e-commerce market. According to World Bank data, as of 2013 India had approxi- mately 189.1 million Internet users (15.1% of the 1.25 billion popu- lation) compared with only 60.7 million (5% of the population) just four years earlier (see Appendix D for a list of Internet users per 100 population for select countries;). The Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry of India estimated the Indian e-commerce industry at $16 billion in 2013, a large increase from estimates of $8.5 billion in 2012 and $2.5 billion in 2009.2 On the other hand, Forrester Research reported that Indian e-commerce was worth only $1.6 billion in 2012 after online travel sales were factored out of the estimates.3 Fast growth was less debated; analysts from the Indian retail consultancy Technopak believed that the country’s e-commerce industry could grow 61 times over the next decade.4 Overall, mom-and-pop stores dominated India’s half-trillion- dollar retail market. According to Deloitte’s India group, organized retail in India comprised only 17% of the market versus over 85% of the market in the U.S.5 Moreover, in addition to stringent laws on FDI, India still had considerable import duties on certain foreign products. According to the International Chamber of Commerce, India ranked 64th out of 75 countries for overall trade and FDI openness in 2013.6 In terms of transportation infrastructure, many of India’s roads were in poor condition and overly congested. Even on the better roads, such as between New Delhi in the north and Mumbai on the western coast, driving took almost twice the amount of time it took to drive the same distance in the U.S., according to Google Maps. In addition, nearly 70% of India’s population lived in remote rural areas, which in some cases had limited access to major highways. Thirty-three percent of villages in India, primarily in the northern 1Julka, Harsimran. “FDI in online retail: Rift arises as MNCs seek 100% FDI, domestic cos insist on partial opening-up.” The Economic Times. 9 Jan. 2014. Web.. 2“India’s e-commerce market rose 88% in 2013: Survey.” The Economic Times. 30 Dec. 2013. Web. . 3Dharmakumar, Rohin. “Amazon’s Perfect Timing for India.” Forbes India Magazine. 2 July 2013. Web. . 4Sen, Sunny. “Moth to a Flame: How China helped Amazon tweak its model for success in India.” Business Today. 16 Feb. 2014. Web. . 5“Changing times. Changing roles: Retail HR gearing up to become a strategic partner.”Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu India Pvt Ltd. 2013. Web. 8 June 2014. . 6“Open Markets Index.” The World Business Organization. International Chamber of Commerce. 2013. Web. 8 June 2014. . CS3−28 cat12354_case3_CS3-1-CS3-39.indd 28 4/3/19 5:13 PM states, lacked all-weather roads, making them almost inaccessible during the monsoon season.7 Furthermore, addresses in India were notoriously difficult to find due to non-sequential numberings, lack of street signs, and narrow, winding streets. It was instead common- place in India to describe locations with directions via landmarks.8 Retailers had tended to prefer commercial airfreight for delivery, but this option had led to increased delivery costs and a high risk of merchandise being offloaded to accommodate passengers.9 Over the past few years, India had experienced a series of major power failures allegedly due to a shoddily constructed electricity infrastructure. For example, in soaring temperatures on June 10, 2014, in New Delhi 16 million people were subject to power black- outs due to unmanageable demand.10 This power failure came only two years after a record-breaking electricity crisis in 2012 in which 600 million people were left without power for two days.11 India also still had a highly impoverished population. In 2013, OECD researchers estimated that 42% of India’s 1.24 billion peo- ple lived on less than $1.25 a day, reflective of its $4,000 GDP per capita.12,13 Much of India’s growth in computing and consumer spending, however, came from a growing middle class of over 160 million people.14 The Brookings Institution predicted that India’s middle class consumption would surpass that of the U.S. by the year 2030.15 However, despite a growing population heav- ily involved in spending, cash payments remained dominant over credit or debit card payments in day-to-day commerce in India. Business Today cited that people in India averaged only six non- cash payments each year. As a result, a “cash on delivery” system had become widely accepted in the e-tailing space and accounted for roughly 50% to 80% of all e-commerce payments.16 7“India Transport Sector.” Transport in South Asia. The World Bank. 2013. Web. 10 June 2014. . 8Narayanswamy, Harihar. “Despite street-map and address, difficult to find location in India.” The Economic Times. 19 Aug. 2009. Web. . 9Bose, Nandita. “E-tailers growth ensnared in India’s logistics jungle.” Reuters. 10 June 2014. Web. . 10“Indian protests over power blackouts amid heatwave spread to New Delhi.” Asia: South China Morning Post. 12 June 2014. Web. . 11Butkiewicz, Lynann. “India’s Electricity Crisis: Background on the Issues.” The National Bureau of Asian Research. 7 Aug. 2012. Web. . 12“Special Focus: Inequality in Emerging Economies (EEs).” Divided We Stand: Why Inequality Keeps Rising. OECD. 2011. Web. . 13“India.” The World Factbook. Central Intelligence Agency. 2014. Web. . 14Varma, Pavan K. “India’s middle class awakes.” The Times of India. 23 Nov. 2013. Web. . 15Kharas, Homi. “The Emerging Middle Class in Developing Countries.” Brookings Institution. The World Bank, June 2011. Web. . 16Das, Goutam. “Cash-on-delivery: Necessary Evil.” Business Today. 16 Feb. 2014. Web. . Competition in India The Indian e-commerce market’s promise of rapid growth had already attracted several players, domestic and international, to the Indian e-tailing scene. Some of the largest in terms of revenue and market share included Flipkart, Snapdeal, and eBay. Flipkart In 2007, two ex-Amazon employees, Sachin Bansal and Binny Bansal (no relation), launched Flipkart, which became the leading domestic e-tailing company in India (https://www.flipkart .com). Having copied some of Amazon’s business model throughout the country, Flipkart’s founders had been able to capture 4.9% of the very fragmented Indian e-commerce market by 2013 (Amazon held 1.6% and eBay 1.2%).17 Flipkart found quick success by developing its own logistics network and by adopting the “cash on delivery” pay- ment option in 2010 in order to adjust to the cash-centric payment habits of Indian consumers. Since its launch in 2007, Flipkart had been dependent primarily on funding from venture capital firms. Snapdeal Although they founded Snapdeal.com as an e-coupon web- site in 2010 (similar to Groupon in the U.S.), Kunal Bahl and Rohit Bansal decided to revamp their site after a trip to China in 2011 dur- ing which they witnessed the dynamic growth of the Chinese e-tailing giant Alibaba. Using Alibaba for inspiration, Bahl and Bansal re-cre- ated Snapdeal.com in 2011 as an e-commerce marketplace (https:// www.snapdeal.com). Valued at $1 billion in June 2014, Snapdeal had relied heavily on funding from its investors.18 The largest of these was American e-commerce firm eBay, which invested $50 million in 2013 and was the largest investor in Snapdeal’s approximately $134 million round of funding in the first quarter of 2014.19 Other investors in this round included Intel Capital, Saama Capital, Nexus Venture Partners, Bessemer Venture Partners, and Kalaari Capital.20 Attempting to replicate Alibaba’s business model in India, Snapdeal offered 5 million products from over 30,000 sellers— much more than Flipkart’s network of 3,000 sellers as of May 2014. Similar to Alibaba’s logistics strategy, Snapdeal opened 40 fulfillment centers in 15 cities across India with which it stored and shipped sellers’ products for a fee.21 Snapdeal planned to open 35 more within the next year.22 eBay The American e-commerce giant entered the Indian market in 2005 after it acquired Baazee.com, India’s largest online market- place at the time, for $50 million plus acquisition costs.23 Initially, 17“Flipkart raises $210 million; will utilise funds for acquisitions.” The Economic Times. 26 May 2014. Web. . 18Rajagopal, Divya. “How Kunal Bahl’s Snapdeal scaled a valuation of $1 billion in two years.” The Economic Times. 20 June 2014. Web. . 19“Why eBay Raised Its Stake In India’s Snapdeal.” Forbes. 4 Mar. 2014. Web.. 20“EBay Inc. Makes Strategic Investment in Snapdeal.”eBay Inc. 26 Feb. 2014.