M
A
RUT
I
SUZUKI
IND
IA
LI
M
I
TED:
SUST
A
I
N
I
NG
PROF
I
T
A
B
I
L
I
TY
A
ft
e
r
India
opened up
i
ts
economy
in
the
ear
ly
1990s,
the
Indian
au
tomobile
industry
w
i
tnessed
intense
competi
t
ion.
Mar
u
ti
Suzuki
India
Li
m
ited
(Ma
rut
i)
had
been
a
dom
inant
player
in
the
Indian
automobile
indus
try since
it
began
ope
rat
ions
in
1981.
Ma
r
u
ti
w
as
so
popul
ar
t
hat
in
India
people
had
long
used
t
he
word
“Marut
i”
as
a
synonym
for
“ca
r.”
Ma
ruti
had
exper
ienced
a
dr
eam
run
f
or
three
decades,
ach
iev
ing
the
lar
gest
mar
ket
share
in
the
passenger
car
i
ndus
t
ry
in
India.
But
for
the
f
i
r
st
t
i
me
aft
er
28
years
of
consistent
g
rowth,
Ma
ruti
exper
ienced
a
f
a
ll
in
sa
les
volume
in
2012
(see
Exhi
b
it
1
).
Even
in
2014,
af
t
er
t
wo
years,
it
had
not
yet
r
ecovered.
R.C.
Bhar
gava,
t
he
cha
ir
man
of
Ma
r
u
ti,
w
as
conce
rned
w
ith
how
to
turn
t
h
ings
around.
He
knew
that
Ma
ruti
had
l
i
t
t
le
con
tr
ol
over
pr
i
c
ing,
g
i
ven
the
fi
e
rce
compet
i
ti
on
in
t
he
sector.
Desp
i
te
the
pr
i
ce
of
cars
remai
n
ing stagnant
over
the
last
decade,
Ma
ruti
and
its
compet
it
o
rs
were exper
iencing
dec
l
ining
sa
l
es.
2
Pr
ices
of
fuel
had
adver
sely
af
fected demand.
Input
costs
f
or
manufac
tur
ing
were
increas
ing
year
af
t
er
year.
Wi
th
such
a
dismal
out
look
for
the
automobi
le
indus
try
and
w
ith
poor
pri
ce
maneuverabi
l
i
t
y,
how
long
could
Ma
ruti
sust
a
in
prof
i
ts?
The
cha
ir
man
knew
he
had
to
dec
rease
t
he
costs
of
manufac
tur
ing
and
he
w
as
consider
ing
bui
l
d
ing
a
s
tate-of
-
the-art
pl
ant
in
G
u
jarat
.
3
Wou
ld
this
reduce
costs
enough
to
he
lp
Maruti
become
more
pr
o
f
itabl
e?
INDI
AN
P
A
SS
ENG
ER
C
AR
M
ARK
ET
T
he
Indian
passenger
car
mar
ket
was
t
he
fastest
g
r
o
w
ing
in
A
s
ia,
d
ri
ven
by
I
ndia’s
lar
ge
populat
ion
of
1.28
bi
l
l
ion
and
a
low
penet
rat
ion
of
fewer
than
12
cars
per
1,000
peop
le
(see
Exhi
b
it
2
).
P
ri
or
to
t
he
1990s,
t
he
Indian
automobi
le
sec
tor
w
as
in
poor
shape
compa
red
to
the
automobile
sec
tors
in
o
ther
count
r
ies,
l
a
r
gely
because
of
demand
-side
cons
tr
a
i
n
ts
such
as
the
low
pu
rchas
i
ng
power
of
the
average
I
ndian
consumer.
B
e
fore
Indi
a
’s
econom
ic
li
ber
a
li
za
t
ion,
the
m
a
j
o
r
i
ty
of
India’s
popu
l
a
tion cou
ld
not aff
o
rd
to
buy
a
ca
r,
and
car
pene
t
rat
ion
w
as
l
ess
than
thr
ee
per
1,000 peop
le.
A
ft
er
l
ibe
r
a
li
zat
ion,
w
i
th
ri
s
ing
income
levels
of
m
iddl
e
-class
fam
ili
es,
the
de
mand
for
passenger
ca
rs
went
up
stead
ily
over
the next
20
yea
rs.
However,
car
pene
tr
a
t
ion
w
as
s
t
i
ll
ve
ry
low
compar
ed
to
in
B
raz
il,
R
ussia,
C
h
ina and developed
count
ri
es
(see
Exhi
b
it
2).
From a
supply-side
perspec
ti
ve,
the
au
tomobi
le
indus
try
had
g
reat
ly benef
i
ted
f
rom
liberal
i
zat
ion,
as
i
n
t
e
rna
tional
au
t
o
mobile
manufact
u
r
e
rs
took
advantage
of
India’s
aff
o
rdable
yet
h
i
ghly
tr
a
i
ned
eng
ineers,
est
abl
ish
ing
manufact
u
ri
ng
ope
r
a
ti
ons
throughout
the
count
r
y.
Due
to
India’s
huge
pool
of
t
a
lent
and
r
ising
income
levels,
India’s
passenger
car
mar
ket
had
g
rown
in
ter
ms
of
p
roduct
ion
and sa
les
and
was
expec
ted
to
g
r
ow
fur
ther
in
com
ing
years.
4
Passenger
vehicles
in
India
could
be
br
oadly
di
v
ided
into
three
seg
ments
—
passenger
cars,
ut
i
l
ity
vehicl
es
and
multi
-purpose
vehicles
—
w
ith
passenger
cars
con
t
r
ibu
ting around 80
per
cent
of
t
o
t
al
sa
les
volumes.
As
of
2014,
this
segment
was
expec
ted
to
g
row
at
a
compound
annual
rate
of
15
per
cent
for
t
he
next
15
to
20
years.
Apart
from
domestic
g
row
th,
automobile
expor
ts
from
India
were
pr
edi
c
ted
to
g
row
at
12
per
cen
t.
It
may
be
noted
here
tha
t,
in
a
low
per
cap
i
ta
i
ncome
country
l
i
ke
India,
t
wo-
wheelers
(
motorcycles
and scooter
s)
consti
t
u
ted a
m
a
jor
mode
of
t
ranspo
r
tat
ion
f
or
the
lower
m
iddle
c
lass,
who
would
eventua
lly
g
raduate
to
the
small
-car
seg
ment.
In
most
ci
t
ies
and
towns,
due
to
the
poor
quali
ty of
roads
and
excess
i
ve
t
r
a
f
f
ic
congest
ion,
motorcycles
were
the
f
i
rst
cho
ice
f
or
daily
com
mutes.
However,
a
car
was
consi
dered
a
pr
i
zed
possess
ion
f
or
a
m
iddle-class
Indian
fam
il
y,
even
though
it
was
not
used
on
a dai
ly
basi
s.
W
ith
r
ising
i
ncome
levels,
this
he
ld
g
reat
prom
ise
for
car
manufac
turers,
as
fewer
than
12 people
per
1,000
owned
a
car
in
India,
r
e
f
lect
ing
huge
mar
ket
potent
i
a
l.
M
A
JOR
CO
M
PE
TIT
ORS
OF
M
ARUTI
T
he
re
were
many
players
in
the
passenger
car
seg
m
ent
in
India.
Some
of
these
players
were
domest
i
c, such
as
Mar
u
ti,
T
a
ta
and
Mahindra.
O
the
rs
such
as
H
yundai,
Honda
and
Toyota
were
f
rom
other
Asi
an
count
r
ies.
T
he
t
wo companies
w
i
th
t
he
lar
gest
market
share
in
India
were Ma
rut
i,
at
49
per
cen
t,
and
H
yundai,
at
21
per
cent
(
see
Exh
i
b
it 3
for
t
rends
in
the
mar
ket
sha
re of
Ma
r
u
ti
and
i
ts
competi
tor
s).
A
lthough
t
here
w
e
re
many
players
in
t
he
luxury
seg
ment
of
the
mar
ket
such
as
Mercedes-
Benz,
BMW and
Aud
i,
there
w
e
re
few
buyers
who
had
the
i
nco
me
to
suppo
rt
such
pu
rchases.
The
re
w
e
re
ot
her
competit
o
rs
for
Mar
u
ti
such
as
Ford,
GM,
N
i
ssan,
Renaul
t,
Š
koda
and
Vol
ks
wagen
that
compet
ed
in
m
ini-
and
m
id-segment
cars.
These
companies
had
taken
considerable
mar
ket
sha
re
from Ma
ruti
in
recent
years.
M
A
RUTI:
THE
CO
M
P
ANY
Estab
l
ished
in
1981,
Ma
r
u
ti
en
joyed
the
lar
gest
market
share
in
the
Indian
passenger
car
seg
ment.
In
2014,
Ma
rut
i,
w
ith
t
wo pr
oduct
ion
f
aci
l
i
t
ies
at
Gur
gaon
and Manesar
(both
in
the
National
Cap
i
tal
Reg
ion of
Del
h
i),
had a
p
roduct
ion
capac
ity
of
more
t
han
1.4
m
illion un
i
ts
per
year
.
5
T
he
produc
t
ion
faci
l
it
ies
had
m
ore
than 12, 000 empl
oyees
6
and produced
more
than
16 automobile
models,
7
each
w
ith
multi
p
le
variants.
8
Examples
of
Marut
i
’s
product
of
f
e
rings
inc
luded
small
cars
l
i
ke
t
he
Maruti
A
lto,
Wagon
R
and
A
-Star.
Small
cars
made
up
41.2
per
cen
t
9
of
Marut
i’s
t
o
t
al
sa
les
uni
ts.
In
the
compact
car
segment, Mar
u
ti
of
fered
ca
rs
such
as
the
Sw
i
f
t,
Est
i
lo,
Ri
tz and
Cel
e
ri
o.
This seg
ment
made
up
24
per
cent
of
Mar
u
t
i
’s
t
o
t
al
sal
es.
In
the
m
i
d
-si
ze
segment,
t
he
company
of
fered
the
S
X4
and
D
z
ire,
which
cont
ri
but
ed
19.1
per
cent
of
sales.
The
sport
u
t
i
l
i
ty
vehi
c
le
seg
ment
made
up
j
ust
5.8
per
cent
of
sales
and
con
t
r
ibuted
less
to Ma
rut
i
’s
p
rof
i
ts
t
han
small
and
m
id-segment
cars.
F
ina
ll
y,
in
t
he
vans
segment,
the company
was
known
for
t
he
O
mni
and
Eeco,
w
h
ich
con
t
r
ibu
ted
9.6
per
cent
to
its
over
a
ll
sa
les.
The
remai
n
ing
sa
les came
from
other
models
of
Maruti
ca
rs.
F
rom
the
Ma
ruti
800
in
1983
up
to
the
launch
of
the
C
e
l
e
rio
in
Februa
ry 2014,
Mar
u
ti
had
rol
led
out
model
a
ft
er
model
and
exceeded
cus
tomer
expec
t
a
tions
in
t
e
r
ms
of
qual
ity
and
val
ue
f
or
money.
Mar
u
ti
focused
on
t
h
ree
key strateg
i
es
to
gener
a
te
sa
les.
Fi
rst
and
foremost,
i
ts
p
ri
c
ing
str
a
tegy
was
very competi
t
i
ve.
For
example,
in
t
he
small
car
seg
ment,
t
he
Mar
u
ti
Al
to
w
as
p
r
iced
10–20
per
cent
low
er
than competing
models
such
as
the
H
yundai
Sant
ro, Tata
Indica
and
C
hev
rol
et
Spa
rk
(see
Exhibi
t4).
Second, Mar
u
ti
spent
a
g
reat
deal
on
resea
rch and develop
ment
to
c
rea
te
more
fue
l
-ef
f
i
c
ient
eng
ines.
T
h
is decreased
the
cost
of
owning
a
car
for
a
consumer;
I
ndian
customers
were
very
sensi
ti
v
e
10
r
egarding
the
fuel
ef
f
iciency
of
vehicl
es,
since
fuel
cos
ts
were
hi
gh
r
e
lat
i
ve
to
average
i
nco
me
levels.
Thi
rd,
Maruti
off
e
red
r
e
li
able
af
t
er-sales
ser
v
ice,
backed
by
its
ext
ensi
ve
se
r
v
ice
ne
t
wor
ks.
11
T
h
ere
w
e
re
more
than
15 competit
o
rs
in
the
mar
ket
and
it
was
never
easy
for
a
company
to
r
e
tain
more
than
40
per
cent
of
t
he
mar
ket
share.
But
Ma
ruti
had
done
it
cons
i
s
ten
tly
over
three
decades.
Ma
ruti
cars
en
joyed
a
unique posi
ti
on
in
t
he
Indian
consumer’s
m
ind.
Maruti
sco
r
ed
hi
gher
than
i
ts
competi
t
o
rs
in
ter
ms
of
pr
ice,
f
uel
ef
f
i
c
iency and
r
e
li
abi
l
i
t
y,
and
i
ts
sa
l
es
were
boos
ted
by
the
prom
ise
of
e
f
f
icient
af
ter-sales
se
r
v
ice.
The
uncer
t
a
inty
of
get
ting
s
tuck
on
Indian
roads
due
to
machine
ry
f
a
il
u
re
was ef
fec
ti
vely
exp
loi
ted
by Ma
rut
i.
As
Mar
u
ti
had
a
ne
t
work of
3,053
se
r
v
ice
stat
ions
in
1,449
Indian
cit
ies,
i
ts
p
rom
ise
of
r
e
li
abi
l
i
ty
wasunmatched
by any of
its
co
mpetitors.
In
ter
ms
of
fuel
ef
f
i
c
iency,
Ma
ruti
ca
rs
pr
ov
ided
an
average
of
three
k
ilometres
more
per
l
i
t
re
of
pet
rol
/diesel
compared
to
i
ts
compet
i
t
o
rs.
The
r
esale
value
of
Mar
u
ti
cars
w
as
also
f
ar
hi
gher
than
that
of
any
of
its
compet
i
tors.
Ma
ruti
of
f
e
red
i
ts
True
V
a
lue
used-car
bus
iness,
with
more
than
454
T
r
ue
V
a
l
ue
out
lets
in
255
Indian
c
i
t
ies,
reassur
ing
its
customers
t
hat
t
hey
would
at
tain
t
he hi
ghest
resale
value
from
any
Maruti
b
rand.
For
an
Indian
m
iddle-class
fam
ily
planning
to
buy
a
new
ca
r, Mar
u
ti
was
the
f
i
r
st
and
most
obv
ious
cho
ice.
CO
M
PE
TING
WITH
M
ARUTI
C
ARS
Mar
u
ti
had
i
mplemented
very
few
pr
ice
increases
in
i
ts
passenger
car
seg
ments
over
t
he
last
10–12
yea
rs.
N
onethe
l
ess,
competi
tors
had
emer
ged
in
each
of
these
seg
ments.
Out
of
Ma
r
u
t
i’s
16
car
models,
each
m
odel
had
any
where
f
rom one
to
seven
c
lose
compet
i
t
o
rs
f
rom
H
yundai,
Tata
Mot
o
rs,
V
o
l
kswagen,
Toyota,
H
onda
or
Chev
rolet
(see
Exhi
b
it
5).
Howeve
r,
despi
te
int
ense
compet
i
t
ion,
Ma
ruti
had
r
e
t
a
ined
its
leadersh
ip
pos
i
t
ion
in
most
segments.
In
fact,
it
was
so
per
vasi
ve
a
brand
that
some
of
its
models competed
among
themselves.
For
example,
its
A
l
to
model
competed
wi
th
the Ma
ruti
800,
and
the Wagon R
competed
w
ith
the
R
i
t
z.
Maruti
had
mai
n
tained
its
“peop
l
e
’s
car”
i
mage
since
i
ts
incep
t
ion
by st
rateg
i
cal
ly
keeping
prices
low
and
posi
t
ioning
ent
ry-
level
ca
rs
f
or
f
i
r
s
t
-
ti
me
buyers.
M
i
n
i
-segment
car
s,
which
cons
t
i
tuted
more
than
80
per
cent
of
Ma
rut
i
’s
t
o
tal
sa
les,
ca
r
r
ied
pr
ice
tags
that
were
at
least
20–30
per
cent
low
er
t
han
those
of
the
ir
nearest
compet
i
t
o
rs.
T
he
bes
t
sel
ling
m
ini
-segment
models
of
Ma
ruti
w
e
re
the
A
lto
and
the
800.
T
he
pr
ices
of
these
cars
had
remained
s
tagnant
for
a
l
ong
ti
me.
In
fact,
in
many
instances,
the
p
r
ices
of
t
hese
cars
had
been
r
educed.
For
example,
the
launch
pri
ce
of
the
Al
to
LX
model
w
as
I
NR299,000
12
i
n
2002,
and
the
pr
ice
was subsequen
tly
r
educed
year
a
ft
er
year
un
t
il
2009,
when
t
he
p
r
ice
w
as
I
N
R257,000,
a
reduct
ion
of approx
i
mately
14
per
cent
af
ter
seven
years.
T
he
p
ri
ce
of
the
800
model
was
I
N
R281,000
in
2002,
whi
ch
was
reduced
to
I
NR221,000
in
2010,
a
drop
of
21
per
cent.
T
he
pr
ice
of
t
he
Wagon
R
was
reduced
from
I
NR359,000
to
I
N
R338,000
during
the
same
period.
However,
Maruti
was
ab
le
to
inc
r
ease
the
pr
i
ce
mar
g
inally
for
the
compact
and
m
id
-si
ze
segment
cars
over
this
pe
ri
od,
which
boosted
the
revenue
of
the
company.
T
he
passenger
car
mar
ket
in
India
had
w
i
tnessed
i
n
t
ense
p
r
ice
compet
i
tion.
It
was
so
int
ense
t
hat
not
a sing
le
p
r
ice
change
by
any
of
the
p
layers
had
gone
w
ithout
a
react
ion
from
r
i
val
f
i
r
ms.
If
one
looked
car
e
f
u
lly
at
a
ll
t
he
models
of
the
di
ff
e
rent
b
rands,
the
intens
ity
of
t
he
p
ri
ce
w
ar
w
as
ev
ident.
Spec
i
f
i
cal
l
y,
in
the
case
of
the
Ma
ruti
A
lto,
even
Ma
rut
i
’s
c
lose
competit
o
rs
—
H
yundai
and
T
a
ta
—
could
not
r
a
ise
the
pr
ices
of
t
heir
cars
over
the
years;
they
had
to
reduce
the
p
ri
ces
of
the
ir
models
to
r
e
tain
mar
ket
share.
For
example,
in
A
p
r
il
2004,
when
t
he
p
ri
ce
of
t
he
Maruti
A
lto
f
e
ll
by around
7
to
8
per
cen
t,
the
H
yundai Sant
ro
pr
i
ce
co
rr
espond
ing
ly
fell
by
4.6
per
cen
t.
Si
m
i
larl
y,
in
June
2009,
w
hen
t
he
Ma
ruti
Al
to
p
r
ice
fell by 8.8
per
cent,
the
H
yundai
San
tro
p
ri
ce
f
e
ll
by 7.7
per
cen
t,
whi
le
the
Tata
I
ndica
p
r
ice
f
e
ll
by
9.8
per
cent.
T
hough
it
was
never
easy
for
car
manufac
turers
to
reduce
pr
i
ces,
they
were
left
w
ith no
cho
ice
but
to
sell
the
ir
p
roduc
ts
at
reduced
or
stagnant
pr
ices.
Even
for
t
he
m
i
d
-si
ze
and
compact
segments,
Ma
ruti could
not
inc
rease
pr
i
ce
when
it
w
ish
ed
to
due
to
pr
ice
compet
i
t
ion.
Though
t
he
company
had
been
able
to
r
e
t
a
in
i
ts
l
eade
rsh
ip
posi
t
ion,
its
mar
ket
sha
re
had
fal
len
over
t
he
years
due
to
t
he
intense
pr
ice competi
t
ion.
I
n
2001,
Ma
ruti
had
t
o
t
al
revenue
of
I
NR70.21
bi
l
l
ion,
which
inc
luded
o
ther
inco
me
w
ith
net
sa
les.
The
re
was
a
st
eady
r
ise
in
Maruti
’s
revenue
even
though
sales
volumes
f
e
ll
f
rom
2011
to
2014.
In
2014,
Mar
u
ti
reg
ister
ed
sa
l
es
revenue
of
I
NR445.43
bi
ll
ion,
a
r
ise
of
more
than
500
per
cent
in
14
years
(see
Exh
i
b
it
6
).
Even
though
Maruti
could
not
raise
t
he
pr
ices
of
i
ts
m
ini
-segment
cars,
the
r
ise
in
sa
les
revenue
was
mainly
due
to a
r
ise
in
un
it
sal
es
and
mar
g
inal
increases
in
the
p
r
ices
of
i
ts
compact
ca
rs.
INPUT
CO
S
TS
T
he
p
r
ices
of
raw
materi
a
ls
for
cars
had
r
isen
si
gni
f
i
cant
ly since
2001.
Bas
ic
metal
p
r
ices
had
i
ncr
eased shar
p
l
y,
except
for
the
p
ri
ce
of
a
lum
inum.
Steel
was
the
maj
or
raw
mater
i
al
f
or
cars,
and
t
he
pr
i
ce
of
s
t
eel
had
increased
by
at
least
thr
ee
ti
mes
(see
Exh
ibi
t7)
si
nce
2001.
13
A
part
f
rom
stee
l,
ot
her
inputs
f
or automobi
les
such
as
coppe
r,
lead
and
rubber
(
see
Exh
ibi
t7)
had
gone
up
in
cost
by
at
least
240
per
cen
t.
Even
the
pr
ice
of
a
lum
inum
had
exper
ienced
a
mar
g
inal
r
ise
of
7
per
cent.
The
only
raw
mater
i
al
f
or
which
t
here
had
been
no
si
gnificant
pr
ice
ri
se
was
pal
lad
ium,
but
its
usage
in
car-
mak
i
ng
was
relat
i
vely neg
li
g
ible.
A
part
f
rom
these
materi
a
ls,
the
p
ri
ces
of
o
ther
mater
ials
and
inpu
ts
such
as
e
lec
t
r
i
c
ity
and
f
uel had
gone
up
during
the
sa
me
per
iod.
T
he
r
ise
in
i
nput
prices
had
been
as
much
as
300–400
per
cen
t. Speci
f
ical
l
y, steel
and
rubber
p
r
i
ces
had
s
i
gnif
ican
tly
raised
t
he
cost
of
p
roduc
t
ion.
L
abour
Costs
T
he
cost
of
l
abour
had
gone
up
si
gni
f
i
cant
ly
due
to
the
r
ise
in
gener
al
pr
i
ce
l
evels
(i
n
f
lat
ion)
in
India.
Though
Mar
u
ti
depended
heav
ily
on
con
tr
act
ual
labo
u
rers
to
cut
down on
labour
costs,
it
had
to
keep
pace
w
ith
the
mar
ket
in
t
e
r
ms
of
compensat
ion
and
per
ks
in
order
to
r
e
tain
employees.
The
wage
dispar
i
ty bet
ween
Ma
rut
i
’s
regular
e
mployees
and
contrac
tual
e
mployees
in
the
past
had
l
ed
to
HR
issues
that
had
g
i
ven
Maruti
much
bad
publ
ici
t
y.
The
t
ragedi
es
of
t
he
Manesar
p
lan
t
14
had
forced
Ma
ruti
to
rev
i
s
it
t
he
compensat
ion
packages
g
i
ven
to
i
ts
employees.
This
had
resu
l
ted
in
fur
ther
r
i
s
ing
employee
costs.
T
he
employee
cost
had
been
a
mere
I
NR1.99
bill
ion
in
2001,
but
had
r
isen
to
I
NR10.69
bi
l
l
ion
in
2013–2014
(see
Exh
i
b
it
6
).
It
m
ay
be
noted
that
a
long
w
ith
Mar
u
t
i
’s
cos
ts,
the
l
abour
costs
per
unit
for
its
competit
ors had
a
lso
ri
sen
acco
rding
ly
during
t
he
same
t
i
me
peri
od.
S
elling
Costs
Wi
th
t
he
au
tomobile
sector
being
so
f
iercely compet
it
i
ve,
Mar
u
ti
needed
to
spend
a
l
ot
on
promot
ional act
i
v
it
ies.
The
d
i
s
t
r
ibu
tion
and
channel
costs
had
a
lso
risen
w
ith
the
r
ise
in
f
uel
pri
ces.
15
For
Mar
u
ti
to
retain
i
ts
mar
ket
sha
re,
it
had
to
engage
in
ext
ensi
ve
ad
campai
gns
on
telev
ision
and
t
h
rough
ot
h
er
promotional
avenues.
T
he
cost
of
adver
t
i
s
ing on
tel
ev
ision
had
r
i
sen
each
year,
resul
ting
in
i
ncr
eased spend
ing
on
p
romotion. The
p
romotion
and
t
e
lev
i
s
i
on
cos
ts
had
r
isen
f
rom
I
N
R6.33
b
i
l
lion
in
2001
to
I
NR64.99
bi
l
lion
in
2014
(see
Exh
ibi
t
6
).
In
per
capi
ta
ter
ms,
expenses
had
r
i
sen
from
a
mere
I
NR18,069
to
a
whopping
I
NR56,266 per
car
dur
ing
the
same
per
iod.
KE
E
PING
DO
WN
CO
S
TS
T
he
au
tomobi
le
indus
try
was
at
a
crossr
oads
where
t
he
costs
of
raw
mater
i
a
ls
and
ope
r
a
tions
cont
inued
to
increase
subs
tan
t
ial
ly
w
ithout
a
cor
respond
ing
rise
in
the
pr
ices
of
the
pr
oduc
ts
sold.
For
compani
es
in
this
sect
o
r,
it
w
as
very
di
ff
icu
lt
to
sustain
pr
o
f
it
levels
t
hat
met
the
expec
t
a
ti
ons of
s
tak
eho
lders
and
t
he
mar
ket.
It
seemed
that
the
sol
u
ti
on
lay
in
the
i
mplem
ent
a
tion
of
more
ef
f
ici
ent
product
ion.
As
p
r
ices
had
remained
st
icky
for
an
extended
pe
ri
od
of
t
i
me
and
costs
kept
r
i
s
ing,
fir
ms
needed
to
i
nnovate
to
b
ring
costs
down.
Manu
fac
turers
cont
inued
to
add
new
fea
tures
to
their
p
roduc
ts
and
in
the
p
rocess
d
i
scovered
cost
-cut
t
ing
measures.
Mar
u
ti
had
been
do
ing
this
successful
ly
for
more
than
t
wo
decades.
However,
in
the
scenar
io
of
r
ising
costs,
the
company
faced
major
cha
l
lenges,
as
the
re
was
no cushion
a
llow
ing
it
to pass
on
the
bur
den
to consumers.
Any
attempt
on
Mar
u
t
i
’s
part
to
raise
pr
ices
was
met
w
ith
a
pr
ice
cut
by
its
r
i
vals.
Y
et
t
he
ri
val
f
i
r
ms
were
also
fac
i
ng
the
same
chal
lenges;
in
fac
t,
the
cha
l
lenges
were
worse
f
or
them
than
f
or Mar
u
t
i.
T
he
on
ly
al
t
e
rna
t
i
ve
for
t
he
manufac
t
u
rers
was
to
keep
t
he
costs
of
produc
t
ion
down
thr
ough
i
ncreased
ef
f
ici
ency.
As
increasing
the
pr
i
ce
for
most
Mar
u
ti
models
was
out
of
the
ques
tion,
the
on
ly sol
u
ti
on
lay
in
achiev
ing
techni
cal
ef
fic
iency
and
econom
ies
of
scal
e.
The
gap
bet
ween
the
average
cost
and
the
p
r
ice
was
quick
ly shr
ink
ing
for
each
model.
The
r
e
fore,
to
remain
r
e
levant
in
the
mar
ket,
Ma
ruti had
to
innovate
const
antly
to
cut
down
cos
ts
and
achieve
the
ri
ght
scale
of
produc
t
ion.
Ach
iev
ing
econom
ies
of
scale
was
the
only
sol
u
t
ion
in
t
he
f
ace
of
ri
s
ing
input
and
l
abour
cos
ts.
F
UEL
PRICES
A
ND
D
E
M
AND
FOR
P
A
SS
ENG
ER
C
ARS
T
he
ri
se
in
t
he
pr
ice
of
crude
oil
had
not
helped
t
he
cause
of
the
automobile
sec
tor
in
India.
Fuel
p
ri
ces
had
i
ncr
eased,
whi
ch
si
gn
i
f
ican
tly
i
mpact
ed
t
he
g
row
th
of
the
sec
tor.
In
2014,
whi
le
add
ressing
t
he
media,
Maruti
chai
r
man
R.C.
Bhar
gava
in
fact
put
t
he blame
for
dec
l
ining
sa
les
squarely on
increases
in
the
pr
ices
of
pe
tr
ol
and
di
esel.
These
p
r
ices
had
i
ncr
eased
by
20
per
cent
in
the
last
t
wo
yea
rs,
adverse
ly
i
mpacting
car
sales.
The
pr
ice
of
pe
tr
ol
w
as
de
regul
a
ted
in
India
and
was
l
inked
to
c
rude
o
il
pr
ices.
T
he
pri
ce
of
c
rude
oil
had
i
ncreased
f
rom
$25.64
per
bar
rel
in
2001
to
around
$110
per
bar
r
el
in
2014
(see Exhi
b
it
7
).
A
part
f
rom
the
r
ise
in
c
rude
pr
ices,
local
t
axes
on
pet
roleum
produc
ts
were
very
h
i
gh
in
India,
which
fur
ther
raised
the
p
ri
ces.
T
he
d
iesel
pr
ice
w
as
regulat
ed
and
kept
low
through
subs
idies.
T
h
is
helped
car
manuf
act
u
rers
l
i
ke
Maruti
to
cha
r
ge
a
p
r
e
m
i
um
on
diesel
cars.
However,
t
he
pr
ice
of
di
esel
was
slow
ly being de
regul
a
ted
in
India.
Wi
th
a
new
un
ion
government
that
w
as
f
i
r
m
ly
focused
on
ref
o
r
ms,
the
d
iesel
pr
ice
w
ould
soon
be
de
regul
a
ted.
Once
t
h
is
occu
r
red,
d
iesel
var
ian
ts
of
ca
rs
wou
ld
lose
t
heir
edge
over
petrol
var
iants.
The
deregul
a
ted
d
iesel
pr
ice
would
f
u
rt
her
adversely
i
mpact
the
demand
for
automobi
les
in
India.
P
ROFIT
ABILITY
Mar
u
ti
had
been
ab
le
to
mai
n
tain
a
steady
ri
se
in
p
rof
its
desp
i
te
cha
l
lenges
that
were
beyond
t
he
con
tr
ol of
the
company,
such
as
incr
eased
costs
and
fuel
p
r
ices
that
af
fec
ted
t
he
demand
f
or
cars.
In
2002,
it
post
ed
a
net
p
rof
i
t
16
of
I
N
R1.04
bi
l
l
ion,
a
mere
1.5
per
cent
of
net
sales.
In
2014,
Mar
u
t
i
’s
net
prof
its
had
ri
sen
to
I
NR27.83
bil
l
ion
or
6.3
per
cent
of
net
sales (see
Exh
ibi
t
6
).
Mar
u
ti
remained
focused
on
maxi
m
i
z
ing shareho
lde
rs’
weal
th
despi
te
the
compet
i
ti
ve
mar
ket
env
ironmen
t.
Each
year,
Mar
u
t
i
’s
financial
r
esul
ts
exceeded
mar
ket
expectat
ions.
DECI
SION
TO
ENT
ER
G
U
J
A
R
AT
Mar
u
ti
had been
con
templat
ing ent
e
ring
G
u
jar
at
and set
t
ing
up
a
p
lant
wi
th
an
ins
t
a
l
led
capac
i
ty
of 300,000
uni
ts
per
year
w
i
th
an
invest
ment
of
I
NR60
bi
l
li
on.
It
was
expected
that
any
new
facil
ity
would
be
more
eff
icient,
as
it
wou
ld
use
the
latest
technology
and
subsequen
tly
the
cost
of
product
ion
wou
ld
be
lower.
Theref
o
re,
once
ope
rat
iona
l,
the
fac
i
li
ty
would
help
Ma
ruti
achieve
bet
t
er
econom
ies
of
scale
so
that
it
could
compete
bet
t
er
and
sustain
i
ts
pr
o
f
i
ts.
Ho
wever,
set
ting up
a
new
pl
ant
was
a
messy affair
in
India,
w
ith
regul
a
t
ions
rel
ated
to
ever
y
thing
from
land
acqu
isi
t
ion
to
obt
a
i
n
ing
clea
rances
from several
m
inist
r
ies.
The
Tata
Nano’s
Singur
p
lant
debac
l
e
17
w
as
st
i
ll
f
resh
in
ever
ybody
’s
m
e
mor
y.
Bhar
gava
had
various
quest
ions
to
cons
i
der.
Could
he
find
a
way
to
increase
pr
ices
to
ach
ieve
hi
gher
pr
o
f
i
tab
i
l
it
y,
thus avoiding
the
capi
t
al
expendit
u
re
of
bu
il
d
ing
a
pl
ant?
Would
the
bui
l
d
ing
of
a
new
plant
rea
lly
sus
tain
prof
i
ts
or
w
ould
it
take
so
long
that
it
wou
ld
not
be
w
o
rth
the
i
n
i
t
ial
inves
t
ment?
EX
H
IBIT
1:
DO
M
ES
TIC
S
A
L
E
S,
E
XP
ORTS
A
ND
T
O
T
AL
S
A
L
ES
(UNIT
S)
OF
M
A
RUTI
C
A
RS
2013-14
2012-13
2011-12
2010-11
2009-10
2008-09
2007-08
2006-07
2005-06
2004-05
2003-04
2002-03
2001-02
2000-01
792167
764842
674924
561822
536301
472122
362426
352404
350814
1155041
1171434
1133695
1271005
1018365
To
tal
Exports Dom
e
stic
EX
H
IBIT
2:
M
O
T
OR
VEHICLE
PRODUCTION,
C
AR
PE
N
E
TR
A
TION
A
ND
P
ER
C
A
PITA
INCO
ME
OF
SE
L
ECT
COUNTRIES
Count ry
|
M
oto
r
Vehicle
Pr
odu
ction
(
in 2014)
|
A
u
tomob
ile
Density
(Ca rs per 1,000
P
eople)
|
P
er Capita
Income
in US $P PP in 2013–14
|
India
|
4,145,194
|
12
|
$3,843
|
Chi na
|
19,271,808
|
44
|
$9,055
|
B r a zi l
|
3,342,617
|
178
|
$11,747
|
Russ ia
|
2,231,737
|
233
|
$17,518
|
U.K.
|
1,576,945
|
457
|
$36,569
|
Fr ance
|
1,967,765
|
481
|
$35,295
|
U.S.
|
10,328,884
|
423
|
$51,714
|
J apan
|
9,942,711
|
453
|
$35,855
|
G er many
|
5,649,269
|
517
|
$38,666
|
No
t
e
:
Per
c
ap
ita
i
n
c
o
me
(
PPP)
r
e
f
e
rs
to
how
m
a
ny
U.
S.
do
ll
a
rs
a
re
r
equ
ir
ed
to
buy
a
p
r
e
-
de
fi
ned
ba
sk
et
of
c
o
m
m
o
d
iti
es
in
d
iff
e
r
ent
c
oun
tri
e
s.
It
is
d
i
f
f
e
r
ent
from
t
he
o
ffici
al
ex
c
hange
r
a
te
c
on
v
e
rsi
on
of
per
c
ap
ita
i
n
co
m
e.
It
d
iff
e
rs
fr
om
c
o
u
n
try
to c
oun
try,
ba
s
ed
on
t
he
pu
rc
ha
si
ng
p
o
wer
of
a
c
u
rr
ency
in
t
he
d
o
m
e
stic
e
c
on
o
m
y.
For
e
xa
m
p
le,
if
one
r
equ
ir
es
US$1
00
to
buy
a
p
r
ede
fi
n
ed
ba
sk
et
in
t
he
Un
it
ed
S
t
a
t
e
s,
and
if
t
he
sa
me
b
a
sk
et
c
an
be
pu
rc
ha
s
ed
in
I
nd
ia
f
or
I
NR4
,
000,
t
hen
t
he
PPP
e
xc
hange
r
a
te
is
I
NR40
/
US
$
1,
whe
r
eas
t
he
o
ffici
al
e
xc
hange
rate
is
a
r
ound
I
NR60
/
U
S
$1.
P
er
c
ap
ita
i
n
co
me
in
U
S
$PPP
is
a
be
tt
er
i
nd
ic
a
t
or
of
t
he
a
ff
o
r
dab
ili
ty
of
bu
yi
ng a
c
ar
t
han
n
o
m
i
nal
p
er
c
ap
ita
i
n
c
o
m
e.
Sou
rc
e
:
T
he Wo
rld
B
a
n
k,
“
Pa
ss
enger
c
a
rs
(
per
1
,0
00
p
e
op
l
e
)
,”
h
tt
p
://
da
t
a
.
wo
rl
db
a
n
k.
o
r
g
/i
nd
ic
a
t
o
r/I
S
.
VEH
.
PCAR
.
P3
,
a
cc
es
s
ed
Sep
te
m
b
er
12,
20
1
4.
EX
H
IBIT
3:
TRENDS
IN
M
A
RK
ET
S
H
A
RE
OF
M
ARUTI
AND
ITS
CO
M
PE
T
I
T
O
RS
IN
INDIA
(
Mar
ket
Share
in
Percentages)
Y
ear
|
M
ar uti
S uzuki
|
H
y
und
ai M oto rs
|
T
ata M oto rs
|
M
ahind ra
& Mahind ra
|
T
o
y
ota
M
oto
r
s
|
Oth
ers
|
2002
|
50
|
13
|
13
|
7
|
4
|
13
|
2003
|
46
|
15
|
15
|
7
|
4
|
13
|
2004
|
46
|
14
|
16
|
8
|
5
|
11
|
2005
|
46
|
13
|
17
|
8
|
4
|
12
|
2006
|
46
|
14
|
17
|
7
|
4
|
12
|
2007
|
46
|
14
|
16
|
6
|
4
|
14
|
2008
|
46
|
14
|
15
|
8
|
4
|
13
|
2009
|
47
|
16
|
15
|
8
|
3
|
11
|
2010
|
45
|
16
|
15
|
8
|
3
|
13
|
2011
|
45
|
14
|
14
|
7
|
3
|
17
|
2012
|
44
|
14
|
13
|
8
|
6
|
14
|
2013
|
49
|
21
|
6
|
7
|
3
|
13
|
No
t
e
:
F
i
gu
r
es
w
e
re
r
o
u
n
d
ed
o
ff.
Sou
rc
e
:
Da
ta
co
m
p
il
ed
by
t
he
a
u
t
hor
from
S
o
ci
e
ty
of
I
nd
i
an
Au
t
o
m
ob
ile
M
a
n
u
f
a
ct
u
r
e
rs,
ww
w
.sia
m
i
nd
i
a
.co
m
/
;
I
C
R
A
L
i
m
it
ed,
ww
w
.icr
a
.i
n
/
F
il
e
s/
t
i
c
k
e
r/
PV
-I
ndu
st
r
y-
201103
.p
d
f
;
Sha
ll
y
Se
th
Moh
il
e,
“Ma
r
u
ti
S
u
z
u
k
i
’s
Ma
rk
et
Sha
re
R
is
es
to
H
i
ghe
st
in
Th
r
e
e
Y
ea
rs,”
L
ive
Mi
n
t
,
J
anua
ry
13,
2014,
ww
w
.live
m
i
n
t.co
m
/
C
o
m
p
a
n
i
e
s
/
z
2
z
c
A
j
z
ly
Oe1
Il
q
Mi
R
fk
w
J/Ma
r
u
t
i
-
S
u
z
u
kis-
m
a
rk
e
t-
s
ha
r
e
-ris
e
s-t
o
-
h
i
ghe
st
-
i
n
-t
h
r
ee
-
yea
rs.
h
t
m
l
;
and
Ra
vi
K
is
ho
re
O
ak
u
ri,
“Ma
r
k
et
Sha
re
of
Au
to
m
o
b
i
le
C
o
m
p
an
i
es
in
In
d
ia
2
013:
Top
P
l
a
y
er
in
I
ndu
stry,”
J
u
ly
6,
2014,
ww
w
.c
u
rr
en
t
wee
k.co
m
/
m
a
rk
e
t-s
ha
r
e
-
o
f-
au
to
m
ob
il
e
-
co
m
p
an
i
e
s
-i
n
-i
nd
i
a
-
20
1
3
t
op
-
p
l
a
y
e
rs-i
n
-
i
ndu
str
y
/
.
Sou
rc
es
ac
c
e
ss
ed
Sep
te
m
ber
18,
2
0
14.
EX
H
IBIT
4:
EX
-
SHO
WRO
OM
PRICES
OF
M
ARUTI
C
A
RS
A
ND
CO
M
PE
TITORS
(
INR
in hundred
thousand)
Year
|
Ma
ruti Alto LX
|
Ma
ruti 800
|
H
y
undai Santro
|
Tata Indica
|
Che vrolet Spark
|
Ma
ruti
S wift
Dzire
LXI
|
SX4
VXI
|
Aug-02
|
2 .99
|
2 .81
|
3 .36
|
3 .19
|
**
|
**
|
**
|
Apr-03
|
2 .99
|
2 .56
|
3 .36
|
3 .17
|
**
|
**
|
**
|
No v-03
|
2 .87
|
2 .56
|
3 .46
|
3 .14
|
**
|
**
|
**
|
Apr-04
|
2 .65
|
2 .26
|
3 .3
|
3 .14
|
**
|
**
|
**
|
Aug-06
|
2 .81
|
2 .24
|
3 .24
|
2 .75
|
**
|
**
|
**
|
Sep-07
|
2 .81
|
2 .2
|
3 .28
|
3 .38
|
3 .09
|
**
|
6 .18
|
O c t-08
|
2 .82
|
2 .29
|
3 .48
|
3 .65
|
3 .17
|
4 .89
|
6 .54
|
Jun -09
|
2 .57
|
2 .06
|
3 .21
|
3 .29
|
3 .17
|
4 .54
|
6 .36
|
Feb-10
|
2 .5
|
2 .21
|
3 .44
|
3 .38
|
3 .19
|
4 .6
|
6 .68
|
O c t-11
|
3 .01
|
2 .22
|
3 .76
|
3 .24
|
3 .54
|
5 .32
|
7 .73
|
Apr-12
|
3 .01
|
2 .22
|
3 .76
|
3 .24
|
3 .75
|
5 .3
|
7 .73
|
Sep-13
|
3 .12
|
2 .42
|
3 .76
|
3 .4
|
3 .57
|
5 .38
|
7 .73
|
Apr-14
|
^^
|
^^
|
3 .66
|
3 .85
|
3 .45
|
4 .85
|
7 .15
|
EX
H
IBIT
5:
M
ARUTI’S
CO
M
PE
T
I
TORS
BY
M
ODEL
M
odel
|
Launch
D ate
|
Competitors
|
800
|
1983
|
T a ta Nano
|
O mn i
|
1984
|
T a ta Nano,
T ata Ve nture
|
Gy ps y
|
1985
|
M ahind ra
THARcRDe,
T ata Sumo,
M ahind ra
X y lo
|
W ag o n R
|
1999
|
Niss an
M icra Ac t i v e, Hy und ai
i 10
|
Alto
|
2002
|
Hy undai Sa ntro, Ch e vrolet
S p ark,
T ata
I nd i ca
|
Sw ift
|
2005
|
T a ta Vista, Hy undai
i 2 0,
Šk o d aFab i a, Vo l k s w agen Po l o,
T o y ota Eti os L i va
|
SX4
|
2007
|
Ford Fi e sta, Hy und ai Verna, Honda City, Ško da Rapid, Vol ks w agen Ven t o, Renault Sc a la, Ni s s an Su nny
|
Sw ift
Dz ire
|
2008
|
Honda Am a z e, Hy undai
X cen t,
M ahindra
Verito,
T o y ota Etio s, Ford Cl a s si c,
Che vrolet Sa il,
T ata
M an za
|
A-Star
|
2008
|
Che vrolet Be at, Ni s s an
M icra Acti v e,
F ord
F igo
|
Ritz
|
2009
|
T a ta Vista, Hy und ai
Grand
i 1 0, Hon da Bri o, Ni ss an
M icra, Rena u lt Pu ls e, T o y ota Etios L i va
|
Eeco
|
2010
|
T a ta Venture,
T ata
W in ger
|
Alto K10
|
2010
|
Che vrolet Sp ark, T ata In d ic a, Hy undai
i 10
|
Ertiga
|
2012
|
T o y o ta Inno v a,
M ahindra Xy lo, Niss an Ev alia,
T ata Sumo
Grand e, Che vrolet
T a v era, Che vro let
E njoy
|
Alto8 00
|
2012
|
T a ta Nano, Che vro let Sp ark, T ata In di c a, Hy un d ai Eon
|
Stingray
|
2013
|
Che vrolet Be at, Ch e vrolet
S ail
|
Celerio
|
2014
|
Hy undai
i 10, Ch e vrolet
B eat, Honda Brio
|
EX
H
IBIT
6:
Y
E
ARWISE
R
E
V
ENU
E,
CO
S
TS
A
ND
N
ET
PROFITS
FOR
M
ARUTI
(
A
s
of March
31 of each
y
ear;
INR
in
b
i
ll
ions)
Y
ear
|
T
ot
al Revenue
|
Raw Materials
|
E
mplo y ee Cost
|
S
elling & A d min ist rative
&
Other Man u factu ring
Expen ses
|
Net
Pr ofit
|
2001
|
70.2
|
58.8
|
1.99
|
6.33
|
- 2.69
|
2002
|
75.3
|
58.3
|
2.27
|
6.95
|
1.04
|
2003
|
73.6
|
55.6
|
2.17
|
6.78
|
1.46
|
2004
|
94.8
|
69.7
|
2.93
|
6.07
|
5.42
|
2005
|
114.6
|
85.6
|
1.91
|
6.72
|
8.53
|
2006
|
126.8
|
93.3
|
2.11
|
8.09
|
11.89
|
2007
|
150.5
|
107.3
|
2.26
|
10.95
|
15.62
|
2008
|
190.6
|
137.9
|
3.46
|
13.39
|
17.30
|
2009
|
211.7
|
157.6
|
4.63
|
18.08
|
12.18
|
2010
|
301.2
|
223.6
|
5.38
|
24.31
|
24.97
|
2011
|
375.2
|
285.5
|
7.03
|
35.22
|
22.88
|
2012
|
364.1
|
282.3
|
8.43
|
32.67
|
16.35
|
2013
|
444.1
|
305.7
|
10.69
|
64.99
|
23.92
|
2014
|
445.5
|
313.14
|
13.68
|
59.22
|
27.83
|
Sou
rc
e
:
Cap
it
a
line
Da
t
aba
s
e
s,
ww
w
.c
ap
it
a
li
ne
.co
m
,
a
cc
e
ss
e
d
Sep
te
m
b
er
1
2,
2
014;
a
nd
v
a
ri
o
us
ann
u
al
r
e
p
o
rts
fr
om Ma
r
u
ti, Ma
r
u
ti
S
u
z
u
ki
I
nd
ia
L
i
m
it
ed,
“
O
ur
F
i
nan
ci
a
ls,”
ww
w
.
m
a
r
u
tisu
z
u
ki.co
m
/fi
nan
ci
a
l.
a
s
p
x
,
ac
c
e
ss
e
d
S
ep
te
m
b
er
12,
20
1
4.
EX
H
IBIT
7:
TRENDS
IN
C
O
MM
ODITY
PRICES
(
M
A
J
OR
R
AW
M
A
T
ERI
A
L
S
),
2001–2014
Y ear
|
Al um inum
US$/Tonne
|
Copper US$/Tonne
|
Lead US$/Tonne
|
Rubber US$/Tonne
|
P al l adium
US$/O unce
|
B r ent Crude
P r i c es
$/Barr el
|
Iron,
S teel &
F erro
A l l o ys
(Index)
|
2001
|
1,615.65
|
1,787.05
|
477.89
|
693.70
|
1,041.55
|
25.64
|
137
|
2002
|
1,368.59
|
1,503.60
|
512.84
|
647.90
|
409
|
19.48
|
137
|
2003
|
1,378.28
|
1,647.35
|
444.78
|
1,011
|
255.32
|
31.29
|
150
|
2004
|
1,606.49
|
2,423.11
|
758.82
|
1,371
|
216.58
|
31.18
|
201
|
2005
|
1,833.94
|
3,169.18
|
953.61
|
1,329.40
|
186.03
|
44.28
|
244
|
2006
|
2,377.45
|
4,733.67
|
1,256.62
|
1,932.40
|
274.32
|
63.57
|
237
|
2007
|
2,808.34
|
5,668.69
|
1,665.11
|
2,110
|
337.05
|
54.30
|
271
|
2008
|
2,445.08
|
7,060.10
|
2,608.47
|
2,705
|
374.20
|
91.45
|
337
|
2009
|
1,412.79
|
3,220.20
|
1,134.64
|
1,607
|
188.63
|
44.86
|
307
|
2010
|
2,234.84
|
7,385.67
|
2,370.22
|
3,202.40
|
434.10
|
76.37
|
310
|
2011
|
2,439.13
|
9,554.75
|
2,597.44
|
5,591.90
|
793.10
|
96.29
|
349
|
2012
|
2,143.82
|
8,042.97
|
2,093.74
|
3,856.90
|
659.14
|
110.99
|
386
|
2013
|
2,037.70
|
8,048.76
|
2,339.82
|
3,271
|
712.59
|
112.93
|
405
|
2014
|
1,726.20
|
7,299.46
|
2,150.20
|
2,365.90
|
734.14
|
107.57
|
412*
|
1.
Outline
the important determinants of demand for automobiles. How are cross and income
elasticity of demand relevant to Maruti’s managerial decisions? (10 Marks)
2.
What kind of market structure prevalent in the
Indian Automobile industry? What are the Maruti’s competitive advantages? How
can Maruti sustain its profitability in the future? (10 Marks)