We consider a game with two players, A and B. The players each make one decision, simultaneously with and independently of the other. Each chooses whether to exert effort from the set of alternatives...

We consider a game with two players, A and B. The players each make one decision, simultaneously with and independently of the other. Each chooses whether to exert effort from the set of alternatives {0,1,2}. If the total effort exerted by the two players is x; each player gets a payoff of (:9) (x): The cost of each unit of effort is borne by the player exerting it and is equal to 1. Thus the payoff to a player who exerts y units of effort when the total amount exerted is x is (:9) x y: Write down the strategic form of this game, including the playoffs. Is there a strictly dominant strategy?


HW2 September 12 2019 Due back on Canvas by September 19 by 5.15 pm. 1. (10 points)From Harrington, exercises at the end of chapter 2, # 15. 1 2,3. (5 points each) From Harrington, exercises at the end of chapter 3, #3,4, 2 4. (40) Construct the strategic forms for the game trees in the two attached figures 1 and 2. 3 5. (40)) We consider a game with two players, A and B. The players each make one decision, simultaneously with and independently of the other. Each chooses whether to exert effort from the set of alternatives {0,1,2}. If the total effort exerted by the two players is x, each player gets a payoff of (.9)(x).The cost of each unit of effort is borne by the player exerting it and is equal to 1. Thus the payoff to a player who exerts y units of effort when the total amount exerted is x is (.9)x− y. Write down the strategic form of this game, including the payoffs. Is there a strictly dominant strategy? 4